Entry Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry by Conlin, Michael & Kadiyali, Vrinda
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
6-2004 
Entry Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry 
Michael Conlin 
Syracuse University 
Vrinda Kadiyali 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Conlin, Michael and Kadiyali, Vrinda, "Entry Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry" (2004). 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 151. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/151 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
 
ENTRY DETERRING CAPACITY IN THE 
TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY*
 
by 
Michael Conlin 
Department of Economics 
Syracuse University 
meconlin@maxwell.syr.edu
Vrinda Kadiyali 
Johnson Graduate School of Management 
Cornell University 
kadiyali@cornell.edu  
June 2004 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically tests whether capacity is used to deter entry and whether the amount invested in 
entry deterring capacity is related to market concentration and market presence.  We use a unique dataset 
containing all lodging properties in Texas from 1991 through 1997.  For each of the 3,830 properties, we 
have information on occupancy rate, number of rooms, location and ownership.  This information is 
augmented by market level information such as tax rates, travel expenditures and retail wages.  We find 
that there is higher investment in capacity relative to demand (i.e. idle capacity) in markets with larger 
Herfindahl index and by firms with larger share of market capacity.  These results are consistent with the 
entry deterrence literature that suggests firms in more concentrated markets and firms with larger market 
share have greater incentive to invest in entry deterring capacity. 
                                                     
* We are grateful to Robert Masson, Michael Waldman, Ted O’Donoghue, Patrick Emerson, Andy Miller, 
participants of the Statler Hotel School Faculty Workshop, and participants of the Cornell Applied Microeconomics 
Workshop for their comments, insights and suggestions.  The comments and suggestions provided by two 
anonymous referees and an anonymous co-editor improved the paper significantly.  We would also like to thank Joy 
Peacock and Fan Zhang for excellent research assistance, and Eric Schoenbaechler for library searches.  Michael 
Conlin thanks the Center for Hospitality Research at Cornell University and Vrinda Kadiyali thanks the Whitcomb 
Faculty Fellowship Foundation for financial support. 
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ENTRY DETERRING CAPACITY IN THE TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 There is an extensive theoretical literature on firms strategically investing in capacity to deter 
entry.  However, empirical tests of this hypothesis are quite limited.  This is because of data availability, 
and more critically, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between alternative explanations for why 
firms might have idle capacity.  Besides to deter entry, firms may have idle capacity because of expected 
future demand growth, high demand in the past, and demand fluctuations.  Firms may also have idle 
capacity if collusion increases and this increase was not foreseen by the firms when making prior capacity 
decisions.1  In an effort to distinguish between these alternative explanations and the entry deterrence 
explanation for idle capacity, we turn to a stream of literature that provides insights on how firms’ 
incentives to invest in entry deterring capacity are affected by market concentration and how a particular 
firm’s incentive to invest depends on its market presence.  By testing whether the propensity to invest in 
entry deterring capacity is a function of market concentration and market presence, we are indirectly 
testing whether firms invest in entry deterring capacity. 
 The industry we use for this empirical exercise is the Texas lodging industry.  In this industry, 
demand explanations for having idle capacity seem especially plausible because capacity in this industry 
is “lumpy” and irreversible.  There is also substantial demand variability by day of week and season of 
year.  Therefore, how do we test whether idle capacity in this industry is the result of strategic investment 
in entry deterring capacity?  Using the insights from the literature on the effect of concentration on firms’ 
incentives to invest in entry deterring capacity, we find that there is higher investment in capacity relative 
to demand (i.e. idle capacity) in more concentrated markets and by firms with larger market presence.  
 While the positive correlations between idle capacity and market concentration and between idle 
capacity and market presence are implications of the theoretical literature pertaining to the investment in 
entry deterring capacity, there are other possible explanations.  For example, expected demand growth, 
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perhaps resulting in more idle capacity today, may be greater in highly concentrated markets and greater 
if a firm has a larger share of a particular market.  Or, the amount of idle capacity may be positively 
correlated with demand variability which in turn may be greater in highly concentrated markets and 
greater for firms with a large market presence.  Or, collusion in more concentrated markets is greater than 
expected when the firms were making capacity decisions and the unforeseen level of collusion depends 
on a firm’s market presence.  While unable to explicitly rule out these alternative explanations, we believe 
investment in entry deterring capacity is the more likely explanation for our empirical results. 
 The dataset used to test whether idle capacity depends on market concentration and market 
presence consists of annual information from 1991 to 1997 of 3,830 lodging properties in Texas.  For 
each property, we have annual information on the number of rooms, occupancy rate, geographic location 
and ownership.  The dataset contains all lodging properties in Texas with gross annual revenue over 
$13,000.  An advantage of using the lodging industry, to test whether firms invest in entry deterring 
capacity, is that capacity determination is straightforward (i.e., number of rooms).  In addition, capacity in 
the lodging industry cannot be moved to a different geographical market as is the case in numerous 
industries (such as the airline industry). 
 The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner.  Section II provides an overview of 
the existing theoretical literature on entry deterring capacity.  This literature is divided into models of a 
single incumbent firm versus multiple incumbent firms that select entry-deterring capacity 
noncooperatively.  This section also contains a summary of the empirical literature.  Section III describes 
the lodging industry data and provides descriptive statistics.  Sections IV contains the results of two 
specifications that consider the relationship between idle capacity and market concentration as well as 
how a firm’s market presence affects its propensity to invest in entry deterring capacity.  Section V 
presents conclusions of the analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Note that these alternative explanations do not provide predictions of the effect of market concentration on idle 
capacity nor of which firms are more likely to have more idle capacity in particular markets.   
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II. EXISTING THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 The majority of the theoretical literature on entry deterrence considers a single incumbent firm.  
The more widely cited papers include Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), Spulber (1981), and Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).  Much of this work specifically considers the use of capacity as an 
entry deterrent.  Dixit (1980) argues that a single incumbent firm will invest in capacity to deter entry but 
that after investing in this capacity the firm will use the capacity.  Even though the incumbent firm invests 
in capacity to deter entry, the firm produces at an output equal to capacity and thus does not possess idle 
capacity.  By relaxing Dixit’s linear demand restriction, Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) 
prove that if the marginal revenue for the incumbent firm and the potential entrant are decreasing in the 
other’s output, the incumbent firm may hold idle capacity after investing in the entry deterring capacity.  
The general conclusion of the work modeling a single incumbent firm is that the firm may invest in 
capacity to deter entry and this can result in idle capacity. 
The more recent entry deterrence literature has considered markets with multiple firms who 
behave noncooperatively.  (See Bernheim (1984), Gilbert and Vives (1986), Eaton and Ware (1987), 
Waldman (1987, 1991), and McLean and Riordan (1989).)  While all these papers consider entry 
deterrence by incumbent firms, they reach different conclusions on how market concentration affects the 
incentive to take actions that deter entry.  The Gilbert and Vives (1986) model predicts that the total 
amount firms invest in entry deterrence will increase as the number of firms in the market increases.  This 
result is driven by the fact that the entry deterring action, credibly committing to an output level, not only 
deters entry, which benefits the firm, but also earns revenue for the firm.  The theoretical model in 
Bernheim (1984) predicts that the amount invested in entry deterrence should not change with the number 
of firms in the market.2  Waldman (1987, 1991) notes that the Bernheim result is driven by the fact that 
the benefit of incumbent firms from entry deterring investment occurs at a single critical point.  Entry is 
deterred with probability one if an incumbent firm invests more than this critical level; entry occurs with 
probability one if an incumbent firm invests less than this critical level.  By introducing uncertainty, 
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Waldman eliminates this critical level of capacity and demonstrates that a free-rider problem exists in 
entry deterrence.  The free-rider problem causes the total level of investment in entry deterrence to 
decrease with an increase in the number of firms.3
The models of Bernheim and Waldman assume a very general profit function where a firm’s 
profits decrease with entry and with entry deterring investment.  Due to lodging properties employing 
sophisticated yield management techniques, this generalized profit function results in these models being 
more applicable to the lodging industry than Gilbert and Vives’ model.4  By introducing uncertainty, 
Waldman’s model corresponds better to the hotel industry than Bernheim’s model because incumbents 
are not likely to know the exact capacity investment required to deter entry with certainty. 
Waldman’s model does not allow firms to be heterogeneous.  In the lodging industry, firms not 
only have different cost structures but there exists both vertical and horizontal differentiation.  Firms’ cost 
structures differ due to capacity, amenity and accommodation selections.  In addition, a single firm may 
own multiple properties; often in the same geographic area.  While not explicitly allowing heterogeneous 
firms, Waldman does provide insight regarding what type of firms in the market are more likely to invest 
in entry deterring capacity.  If Waldman’s model allowed for heterogeneous firms, it would predict that 
firms with larger market presence would invest more in entry deterrence if a firm’s benefit from deterring 
entry increases with its market presence and the change in the probability of entry decreases with entry 
deterring capacity investment.5
 The empirical literature testing whether firms invest in capacity to deter entry is very limited.  
This is perhaps due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data and in determining whether the idle 
capacity is the result of firms’ incentives to deter entry.  Firms could hold idle capacity for a number of 
reasons besides entry deterrence.  Because capacity is lumpy, idle capacity may exist as firms hold 
capacity today to satisfy future demand.  In addition, because capacity is often not liquid, firms may have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Eaton and Ware (1987) also predict that the number of firms should not affect investment in entry deterrence. 
3 This free-rider problem also arises in McLean and Riordan (1989).   
4 Gilbert and Vives assume that firms compete as Cournot competitors. 
5 In the empirical specifications, we interpret market presence to mean the share of market capacity. 
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idle capacity today because demand was high in the past.  If demand fluctuates, a firm may not produce at 
capacity, and thus hold idle capacity, during times of low demand.6  Through its impact on quantity, the 
level of collusion will also affect idle capacity.7  To empirically address whether firms use capacity to 
deter entry, one must consider these alternative explanations of idle capacity. 
The existing empirical papers that test whether capacity is used as an entry deterrent include 
Lieberman (1987), Hilke (1984), Mathis and Koscianski (1996), and Ghemawat (1984).  Using annual 
information on 38 chemical product industries, Lieberman considers whether incumbent firms increase 
capacity pre-emptively to deter entry by new firms.  By regressing whether a new plant is built by an 
incumbent firm and/or by a new entrant on industry growth rate, average plant size, number of plants, and 
average number of plants, the paper finds no evidence that capacity is used as an entry deterrent.  Using 
information from 16 manufacturing industries, Hilke regresses the change in market share of imports 
between 1950 and 1966 on industry measures of profitability, growth, barriers to entry and idle capacity.  
Assuming that import penetration is a reasonable proxy for entry, the ordinary least squares regression 
results suggest that there exists a weak negative relationship between entry and idle capacity.  Mathis and 
Koscianski conclude that idle capacity in the United States titanium metal industry reduced entry from 
1962 to 1991.  Ghemawat presents a case study of the titanium dioxide industry in the 1970’s.  The 
primary conclusion is that Dupont, the lowest cost producer, preempted expansion by its competitors by 
adding new capacity.8   
 While several of these papers conclude that idle capacity reduces entry, data limitations prevent 
them from distinguishing between the alternative explanations for this relationship.  Furthermore, none of 
these papers test whether market concentration or a firm’s market presence affects the amount invested in 
                                                     
6 See Jordan (1983) and Dana (1999a, 1999b) for models pertaining to peak-load pricing. 
7 Firms may also hold idle capacity for strategic reasons other than entry deterrence.  For example, a firm may hold 
idle capacity to enforce a collusive arrangement with its competitors.  See Brock and Scheinkman (1984) for a 
theoretical model that considers capacity and collusion in a repeated game.  In a separate paper (Conlin and 
Kadiyali, 1999) we use this same dataset to empirically test whether capacity affects collusion. 
8 There exist numerous empirical papers testing whether firms undertake strategic behavior, not involving capacity, 
in an effort to deter entry.  For example, Ellison and Ellison (2000) test whether pharmaceutical incumbents 
strategically distort their “investment” in advertising, product proliferation and pricing prior to patent expiration in 
an effort to deter entry. 
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entry deterring capacity.  The only empirical research we are aware of that considers the effect of market 
concentration on entry deterring capacity is Masson and Shaanan (1986).  Using data from 26 United 
States industries, Masson and Shaanan’s results suggest that entry is less likely in industries with low 
price-cost margins and high idle capacity.  They find no statistically significant relationship between idle 
capacity and concentration, and conclude that there is no evidence that firms strategically add capacity to 
deter entry. 
 
III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 We have gathered data from five sources: a private consulting firm in San Antonio called Source 
Strategies Incorporated, the State of Texas Comptroller’s office, the Texas Department of Economic 
Development’s Tourism Division, the United States Census Bureau and various lodging publications.   
Source Strategies Incorporated publishes the Texas Hotel Performance Factbook which reports 
the annual revenue, number of rooms (i.e., capacity), and locations of all lodging properties in Texas with 
gross annual revenue over $13,000.  This information is obtained from the State of Texas Comptroller’s 
office and is based on state tax information.  Source Strategies Incorporated augments this information 
with average annual daily rates (i.e., average price) obtained through surveys, financial reports, 
appraisers, and directories.  Source Strategies also obtains information from Smith Travel Resource 
Incorporated, a private consulting firm that conducts monthly surveys on lodging properties’ average 
daily rates, occupancy rates and operating expenditures.  Average annual occupancy rates (i.e., 
quantity/capacity) are then calculated by dividing total revenue by average annual daily rates and 
capacity.  Idle capacity is then just one minus the occupancy rate (which is equivalent to the number of 
unoccupied rooms divided by the number of rooms).  We obtained this annual information for 1991 
through 1997.  In addition, Source Strategies provided information on whether a property is brand 
affiliated (compared to an independent) and the brand affiliation for those that are brand affiliated.  These 
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data do not have the taxpayer information.  This information we obtained directly from the State of Texas 
Comptroller’s records.   
Annual information on travel expenditures and retail wages for each of the 254 counties was 
obtained from the Texas Tourism Division.  The travel expenditure data are based on information from 
fourteen travel-related businesses and calculated using a model developed by the U.S. Travel Data Center.  
In addition, the Tourism Division provided annual information on the tax rates of lodging properties at 
the city level.9  We obtained annual county level information on population, per capita income, 
unemployment rate and average wage in the construction industry from the Census Bureau.  Finally, 
brands that offer similar services/amenities are classified in the same sector.  The sector (Full-Service, 
Limited-Service or Extended Stay) of each brand was obtained from lodging magazines and textbooks.10
 Summary statistics of the data are provided in Table 1, Table 2 and Figure 1.  Table 1 contains 
the means and average annual growth rates of the county level information and tax rates.  Table 2 
contains annual information on the number of properties, total number of rooms, percent idle capacity and 
Herfindahl Indexes.  The Herfindahl indexes are calculated based on the number of rooms with county, 
county-sector, city, and city-sector as the market definitions.11,12  When calculating the Herfindahl index, 
different properties with the same taxpayer information are considered one firm.13 Perhaps the most 
                                                     
9 While providing information on the large majority of properties in Texas, the Tourism Division information on tax 
rates did not include all cities where lodging properties are located.  We obtained the remaining property tax rates 
through a phone survey.  These include both city and county taxes.  The state tax rate on lodging properties 
remained constant at 6% throughout the 1990s. 
10 The Full Service sector consists of Fairmont, Westin, Four Seasons, Hyatt, Sheraton, Omni, Marriott, 
Renaissance, Loews, Stouffer, Bristol, Crowne Plaza, Hilton, Red Lion, Courtyard, Adam’s Mark, Radisson, 
DoubleTree, Wyndham, Holiday, Ramada, Four Points, Medallion, Holiday Select, Clarion, Howard Johnson and 
Harvey.  The Limited Service sector consists of Hampton, LaQuinta, Holiday Express, Fairfield, Country, Wingate, 
Homeplace, Drury, Days, Comfort, Best Western, Shoney’s, Budgetel, Ramada Ltd, Quality, Sleep, Motel 6, Super 
8, Travelodge, Red Roof, Rodeway, Econolodge, Park, Allstar, Homestead, Microtel, Travelers, Red Carpet, Exel 
and Knights.  The Extended Stay sector consists of Residence, Homewood, DoubleTree Suites, Sheraton Suites, 
Hawthorn, Embassy, Summerfield, Sumner Suites, MainStay, AmeriSuites, HomeGate, Travel Suites, Lexington, 
Villager, Comfort Suites, StudioPlus and Extended Stay.   
11 Because independent properties do not have sector classifications, these properties are not included when 
calculating the Herfindahl indexes for the county-sector and city-sector market classifications. 
12 Similar figures are obtained when the Herfindahl indexes are calculated based on quantity. 
13 To illustrate how the Herfindahl indexes are calculated, suppose there exists four hotels in Anderson County all 
with different taxpayer information.  If the hotels have 200, 150, 100 and 50 rooms, the county Herfindahl index for 
Anderson would be 3000 (402+302+202+102).  If the 200 and 150 room properties had the same taxpayer, the county 
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interesting observation from Table 2 is the growth across years in the number properties and the total 
number of rooms has been accompanied by a decrease in idle capacity.  As expected, the Herfindahl 
index increases when a market is more narrowly defined.  In addition, the Herfindahl index does not vary 
significantly across years for any of the four market classifications. 
While Table 2 does describe the change in the aggregate number of properties and rooms across 
years, it does not provide information on the amount of entry, exit and capacity changes in the lodging 
industry.  Figure 1 depicts the change attributable to new properties, the change attributable to exits and 
the change attributable to property expansions/contractions as a percent of the total number of rooms for 
the different years.14  In addition, Figure 1 differentiates between a new property that is owned by a new 
entrant and one owned by an incumbent (where an incumbent is defined as a taxpayer who owns at least 
one other property in the county).  Given that our annual data consists of years 1991 through 1997, we 
cannot determine those properties that entered or changed capacity in 1991 nor those properties that 
exited in 1997.  The figure indicates that the percent of total rooms accounted for by new properties is the 
primary explanation for the increase in total rooms across years.  Interestingly, a new entrant rather than 
an incumbent owns the majority of these new properties.  Figure 1 also demonstrates that the percent of 
total rooms accounted for by exiting properties range from 1.3 to 2.1 percent depending on the year.  Note 
that while the percent for entering properties has increased somewhat steadily across years, the percent for 
exiting properties has been relatively constant across years.  While not indicated in Figure 1, the majority 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Herfindahl index would be 5400 (702+202+102).  Suppose all four properties again have different taxpayer 
information and the 200 and 150 room properties are in the limited-service sector while the 100 and 50 room 
properties are in the full-service sector.  In this case, the county-sector Herfindahl index would be 5101 
(57.12+42.92) for the limited-service sector and 5556 (66.72+33.32) for the full-service sector.  The calculations of 
city and city-sector Herfindahl indexes are similar to those for the county. 
14 The percentages in 1997 are likely to be slightly understated.  The property information provided by Source 
Strategy Incorporated are based on state taxpayer information and published in March of the following year.  These 
annual publications do not include properties that have entered the previously year and are late in paying their taxes.  
Given that the subsequent year’s publication does include these properties, those properties that were missing in 
years 1991 through 1996 were included in the dataset based on information contained in the subsequent year’s 
publication.  Because we do not have the 1998 data, this cannot be done for 1997.  The regressions in Section IV are 
estimated with the 1997 information.  However, the coefficient estimates do not change appreciably when the 1997 
observations are not included.   
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of the new property entry and exit involve smaller properties.15  As for existing properties changing their 
number of rooms, Figure 1 indicate that while these room changes involve a smaller percent of total 
rooms than property entry and exit, the percentage does range from .7 to 1.5 and appears to be increasing 
across years. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 To test the implications of the entry deterrence literature, we use two different empirical 
specifications.  The first tests whether more concentrated markets have more or less idle capacity.  The 
second specification tests whether firms with a larger market presence have more or less idle capacity in 
the market. 
 There are several issues that must be addressed in the two specifications.  The first is what 
constitutes a market.  Because lodging properties are vertically and horizontally differentiated, any market 
definition is problematic.  We consider four market definitions based initially on geographic location and 
then on amenities/accommodations.  These four are county, county-sector, city and city-sector.  For the 
county (city) market definition, all properties located in the same county (city) are assumed to be in the 
same market.  The county-sector (city-sector) market definition requires properties to be located in the 
same county (city) as well as sector for them to be considered in the same market.16  While none of these 
is ideal, we are interested in whether our results are consistent across the four market definitions. 
                                                     
15 The average property size in our data is over 85 rooms while the average for those that enter is 46.1 rooms and 
for those than exit is 27.6 rooms.  Our finding that smaller properties are more likely to exit is similar to 
Lieberman’s (1990) finding that smaller chemical plants have higher rates of closure and differs from the case 
studies presented in Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990).  While Lieberman attributes his empirical findings to 
economies of scale, smaller lodging properties are more likely to exit because of capital specificity (i.e., it is easy to 
convert a bed and breakfast into a residential home than to convert a hotel into office space or an apartment 
building). Lieberman also finds that firms with larger market shares are more likely to reduce capacity. Neither 
Lieberman nor Ghemawat and Nalebuff provide empirical evidence pertaining to the relationship between idle 
capacity and market concentration nor between idle capacity and market share. 
16 For brand affiliated properties, the sector classification is based on amenities and accommodations.  Therefore, a 
property is more likely (ceterus paribus) to be a closer substitute to other properties in the same sector.  Because 
independents do not have sector classifications and vary widely in terms of amenities and accommodations, these 
properties are not included in the estimation when markets are defined based on county-sector and city-sector. 
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 The second issue concerns how to measure market concentration and a firm’s presence in a 
market.  The results presented in this paper use Herfindahl index based on capacity (i.e., number of 
rooms) as the measure of market concentration.  However, the empirical results do not change appreciably 
when the Herfindahl index is calculated based on quantity instead of capacity.  We calculate a firm’s 
market presence by dividing the firm’s capacity in the market by the total capacity in the market.  As with 
the Herfindahl index, the empirical results change little if market share of quantity instead of capacity is 
used as the measure of a firm’s market presence. 
The final issue is whether to use market level fixed effects in our estimation.  We could include 
market fixed effects and thereby use within market, across year variation to identify the effect of market 
concentration on market idle capacity.  The main problem with including market fixed effects is that there 
is little within market, across year variation in market concentration and idle capacity.  In addition, the 
variation that does exist is primarily the result of entry, exit, capacity expansion and acquisitions.   
Because of the large expenditure on specialized capital and the durability of this capital, the decision to 
enter, exit, change capacity or acquire another property depends on firms’ expectations of returns in the 
future from the investment.  These expected returns are largely a function of market expectations.  If we 
do not account for how these market expectations vary from 1991 to 1997, then using within market, 
across year variation to identify the relationship between market concentration and idle capacity is 
problematic.  For these reasons, we do not include market fixed effects in the first specification.  
However, we are able to account for market level fixed effects in the specification testing whether firms 
with a larger market presence have more idle capacity.  In fact, we are able to include market-year fixed 
effects which not only controls for market expectations and the within year demand variability of the 
market, but also allows the expectations and demand variability to vary across years. By including 
market-year fixed effects, we identify the effect of firm share of market capacity on firm idle capacity 
using within market-year variation across firms. 
Table 3 provides information for the four different market definitions.  The average number of 
properties in a market ranges from 12.5 when a market is defined as a county to 3.7 when a market is 
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defined as a city-sector.  For each market definition, the average number of firms in a market is 
significantly less than the average number of properties.  The reason for this is that a firm often owns 
multiple properties in a market.17,18  Table 3 also indicates that the average number of rooms in a market 
for a firm almost doubles when a market is defined based on not only geographic location but also sector 
classification.  The reason for this is because independent properties have, on average, much fewer rooms 
than brand affiliated properties and independent properties are not included when the market 
classification is county-sector or city-sector.  Finally, the table indicates that those firms with higher 
(lower) than average share of market capacity have, on average, less (more) idle capacity than the market 
average.  When markets are classified based on county, idle capacity is 3.6 percentage points less than the 
average in the market for firms with a greater than average share of market capacity and 2.1 percentage 
points greater for firms with less.  These differences are relatively large, especially for county and city 
market classifications, considering the average percent idle capacity is approximately 42 percent (see 
Table 2).  Because the second empirical specification uses within market-year variation for identification, 
these differences are of concern since they appear to contradict the entry deterrence theory predicting that 
firms with greater market presence have more incentive to invest in entry deterring capacity and thus have 
more idle capacity.  However, these differences do not account for other factors that would influence idle 
capacity; such as brand affiliation and whether the firm recently opened a property in the market.  In fact, 
the reason these differences change dramatically when markets are defined based on sector is because 
independent properties have, on average, fewer rooms and much greater idle capacity than the brand 
                                                     
17 The firm owning multiple properties could be the owner of the brand trademark, a franchisee or an owner of 
multiple independent properties.  In regards to brand-affiliated properties, firms often own multiple brand 
trademarks (i.e., Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express) and franchisees often own multiple properties affiliated with 
different brands.  Furthermore, some firms own properties in different geographic areas, others own properties in 
the same geographic area but in different sectors, while still others own properties in the same geographic area and 
in different sectors.  This is one reason we use four different market definitions.  See Conlin and Rysman (2004) for 
a thorough analysis of the multi-unit ownership issue. 
18 Kalnins and Lafontaine (2002) document multi-unit ownership in the Texas restaurant industry.  They find that 
the probability an existing franchisee owns a new location increases if the franchisee’s existing location is in 
relatively close proximity.  Unlike the restaurant industry a franchisee in the hotel industry often has properties 
affiliated with multiple franchisors. 
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affiliated properties.19 Number of rooms and idle capacity also vary significantly across brands and on 
whether a property was opened within the last year. 
First Specification 
 The first specification tests the relationship between market concentration and idle capacity.  In 
this specification, the following model is estimated. 
(Percent Idle Capacity)m,t= ς t+λ  (Herfindahl Index)m,t+ ηXm,t+  ε
The dependent variable is market m’s percent idle capacity in year t.  Market m’s Herfindahl index (based 
on capacity) in year t is an independent variable measuring market concentration.  We expect λ  to be 
greater than zero based on the entry deterrence literature.  The vector Xm,t includes the following 
variables: market m’s county population, per capita income, average retail wage, travel expenditures, 
unemployment rate, average tax rate and average construction wage as well as the prior year’s growth 
rates of these variables.  These variables control for demand and cost factors, and the expectations of 
these factors, that are likely to influence rooms booked and capacity decisions.  In all regressions we 
correct the standard errors for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering within a market over time.   
 The results of this specification, when the data are pooled, are given in Table 4 for all market 
definitions (county, county-sector, city and city-sector).20,21  In all cases, the estimates of  are positive 
and, for three of the market definitions, statistically significant.
λ
22  In terms of the marginal effect when 
county is the market definition, a 1000 point increase in the Herfindahl index results in an increase in 
market idle capacity of slightly less than half a percentage point.  Many of the coefficient estimates 
associated with the demand and supply variables are also economically and statistically significant.  Table 
                                                     
19 The average number of rooms and the average idle capacity for an independent property is 48.8 and 52.4 percent, 
respectively.  For a brand affiliated property, average number of rooms is 142.2 and average idle capacity is 37.9 
percent. 
20 The results in Table 4 do not change appreciably when only between market variation is used to estimate the 
coefficients. 
21 For presentation purposes, the Herfindahl index, population, per capita income and travel expenditures are 
divided by 1,000. 
22 While the Herfindahl index is arguably endogenous, there are no obvious instrumental variables to resolve this 
problem.  The reason we calculate the Herfindahl index based on capacity rather than quantity is due to this 
endogeneity issue.  
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4 indicates that markets with large lagged population and travel expenditure growths have less idle 
capacity. 
 One explanation for the positive Herfindahl index coefficients is that large firms have more 
incentive to invest in entry deterring capacity causing idle capacity to increase with an increase in market 
concentration.  However, the positive coefficients could also be caused by firms with minimal capacity 
exiting those markets with high idle capacity (resulting in a larger Herfindahl index).  Another 
explanation for the positive Herfindahl index coefficients is that there is less within year demand 
variability and higher expected demand growth in areas with greater market concentration.  Or perhaps it 
is the case that markets with higher concentrations experience greater collusion than was foreseen at the 
time the firms selected capacities.  We control for market factors that are likely to be correlated with 
demand variability, demand growth and collusion (such as market size) by including many market level 
demand and cost factors as independent variables.  However, it may be the case that these independent 
variables do not adequately control for the across market variation in within year demand variability, 
expected demand growth and collusion.  In our second specification, we are better able to account for this 
across market variability by including market-year fixed effects.23
Second Specification 
 We now consider whether firms with a large market presence invest more in entry deterring 
capacity.  For the second specification, we estimate the following model which tests whether firms with 
larger shares of market capacity have greater idle capacity. 
  (Percent Idle Capacity)i,m,t=φ m,t+φ B(Share of Capacity Affiliated with Brand B) i,m,t+  (Share of Market  λ
                               Capacity)i,m,t +  (Incumbent Opens Property)η i,m,t+ ζ (New Entrant Opens Property)i,m,t+ ε  
  
We expect the percent idle capacity for firm i in market m in year t to be affected by not only firm i’s 
incentive to invest in entry deterring capacity but also on market expectations, market demand variability, 
                                                     
23 In another specification, we regress the percent change in the total number of rooms in a market from the prior 
year on the prior year’s Herfindahl index, the prior year’s idle capacity and the same market level demand and cost 
factors as in Table 4.  We find that conditional on idle capacity and these market level demand and cost factors, the 
percent change in the total number of rooms is greater in more concentrated markets.  While these results are 
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market level collusion, the brand affiliations of firm i’s properties and whether firm i has recently opened 
a property in market m.  To control for market expectations, market demand variability, market level 
collusion and brand affiliation, we include market-year and brand fixed effects.24  Because firm i’s idle 
capacity in market m in year t is likely to depend on whether firm i has recently opened a property and the 
effect of the opening on idle capacity is likely to depend on whether firm i has an existing property, we 
include indicator variables for whether an incumbent firm i has opened a property in market m in year t 
and whether a new entrant firm i has opened a property in market m in year t.  In all regressions we 
correct the standard errors for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering within a taxpayer across market-
years. 
 Table 5 contains the results from this specification, when county, county-sector, city and city-
sector are used as the market definition.  The coefficient estimate associated with share of market capacity 
is positive and statistically significant for all four market definitions.  These positive coefficients suggest 
that firms with larger market presence invest more in entry deterring capacity.  The marginal effect of 
increasing firm i’s county share of capacity by 10 percentage points is to increase firm i’s idle capacity in 
the county by 1.15 percentage points. The positive coefficient estimates associated with a property 
opening by a new entrant indicate that properties opened by new entrants have more idle capacity.  While 
this was expected for new entrants, it was also expected that the idle capacity of a firm with an existing 
property in the market would increase if it opened an additional property in the market.  The results in 
Table 5 do not support the contention that an incumbent’s idle capacity increases after opening a new 
property.  The coefficient associated with the incumbent opening a new property varies in sign and is not 
statistically significant for any of the market definitions.  Perhaps incumbents promote the opening of 
new properties more than new entrants.25
                                                                                                                                                                           
consistent with the entry deterrence literature, the specification does use across market variation for identification 
(similar to the first specification). 
24 Because firm i may own several properties affiliated with different brands, we control for brand affiliation by 
including as independent variables the fraction of firm i’s capacity in market m affiliated with each particular brand. 
25 In another specification concerning whether a firm’s share of market capacity affects its decision to invest in 
entry deterring capacity, we test whether the probability that an incumbent firm opens a new property in the market 
depends on the incumbent’s market share.  After controlling for brand fixed effects, market-year fixed effects, and 
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 The coefficient estimates in Table 5 are identified using within market-year variation while the 
estimates in Table 4 are identified using across market, within year variation.  Similar to Table 4, the 
results in Table 5 are consistent with the entry deterrence literature.  However, there are alternative 
explanations for the results in Table 5.  As mentioned in the introduction, if expected demand growth, 
demand variability or an unforeseen level of collusion is correlated with a firm’s market presence and idle 
capacity, then these explanations could explain the results in Table 5.  We believe that investment in entry 
deterring capacity is the more likely explanation for these results. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Empirically testing whether firms’ actions are affected by their incentive to deter entry is quite 
difficult.  This is because there are many reasons, besides entry deterrence, why firms take these actions.  
(Possible actions include advertising, research and development, and capacity investment.)  For example, 
it is difficult to determine if a firm’s advertising expenditure is based on demand considerations or 
whether deterring entry is also important.  This paper distinguishes among the different reasons for firms 
to have idle capacity by considering how market characteristics and market presence affect firms’ 
incentives to use capacity to deter entry.  If a firm’s incentive to take entry deterring actions is influenced 
by market characteristics and market presence, then testing whether the level of the action is a function of 
the market characteristics and a firm’s market presence allows one to empirically address whether the 
action is influenced by entry deterring considerations. 
 This paper finds that more concentrated markets have greater idle capacity.  It also finds evidence 
that firms with larger market shares (whose incentive to deter entry is greater) have more idle capacity 
than firms with smaller market shares. These results are consistent with the entry deterrence literature and 
provide evidence that investment in capacity is affected by entry deterrent considerations. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
prior year performance of the firm (i.e.., average room price and occupancy rate), we find that increasing a firm’s 
share of market capacity increases the probability that the firm opens a new property in the market.  This result is 
not sensitive to market definition and provides some limited evidence that firms with a large market presence invest 
more in entry deterring capacity. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics By County 
 Means Mean Annual Growth (Percent) 
Travel Expenditures (millions) 
 
100.7 1.62 
Annual Retail Wage (thousands) 
 
14.62 0.49 
Tax Rate 
 
5.11* 1.54 
Population (thousands) 
 
82.11 1.28 
Per Capita Income (thousands) 
 
17.59 1.16 
Unemployment Rate 
 
6.64 1.40 
Annual Construction Wage (thousands) 19.05 2.76 
* Does not include the state tax rate on lodging properties which was six percent throughout the 1990s. 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics By Year 
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of Properties 
 
2,669 2,686 2,721 2,778 2,806 2,884 2,891 
Number of Rooms 
 
227,489 228,077 228,244 232,590 236,016 246,740 255,876 
Percent Idle Capacity 
 
44.7 43.4 41.6 39.9 40.0 40.3 40.2 
County Herfindahl Index  
Based on Number of Rooms 
 
1,235 1,223 1,213 1,181 1,144 1,077 1,033 
County-Sector Herfindahl Index  
Based on Number of Rooms* 
 
2,605 2,552 2,551 2,374 2,169 2,057 1,889 
City Herfindahl Index  
Based on Number of Rooms 
 
2,211 2,199 2,169 2,121 2,060 1,980 1,868 
City-Sector Herfindahl Index  
Based on Number of Rooms* 
3,481 3,457 3,451 3,264 2,977 2,867 2,664 
Note: Independent properties are not included when calculating the County- and City-Sector Herfindahl Indexes. 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Market Definition 
 County County-Sector City City-Sector 
Average Number of Properties in Market 
 
12.5 5.5 6.0 3.7 
Average Number of Firms in Market 
 
11.1 4.5 5.5 3.2 
Average Number of Rooms in Market for Firm 
 
95.8 173.4 92.8 162.4 
Average Idle Capacity for Firms in Market with 
Greater than Average Share of Market Capacity 
minus Average Idle Capacity for Firms in Market 
 
 
-3.6% 
 
-1.3% 
 
-3.0% 
 
-1.0% 
Average Idle Capacity for Firms in Market with 
Less than Average Share of Market Capacity 
minus Average Idle Capacity for Firms in Market 
 
2.1% 
 
0.8% 
 
1.9% 
 
0.7% 
Note: Independent properties are not included in the County- and City-Sector market classifications. 
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TABLE 4 
Dependent Variable: Percent Idle Capacity in Market 
Variables County County-Sector City City-Sector 
Herfindahl Index 
 
0.478** 
(0.167) 
 
0.159 
(0.154) 
0.345** 
(0.129) 
0.240* 
(0.129) 
Population 
 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
Per Capita Income 
 
-0.023 
(0.123) 
 
0.065 
(0.136) 
-0.094 
(0.123) 
0.068 
(0.136) 
Retail Wage 
 
0.306 
(0.228) 
 
-0.209 
(0.366) 
0.094 
(0.219) 
-0.137 
(0.262) 
Travel Expenditures 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Unemployment Rate 
 
0.023 
(0.134) 
 
-0.359** 
(0.151) 
0.018 
(0.110) 
-0.399** 
(0.133) 
Tax Rate 
 
-0.234 
(0.217) 
 
-0.282 
(0.428) 
-0.246 
(0.173) 
-0.222 
(0.311) 
Construction Wage 
 
-0.137 
(0.090) 
 
-0.368** 
(0.130) 
-0.152* 
(0.075) 
-0.399** 
(0.115) 
Lagged Population 
Growth 
-0.593** 
(0.161) 
 
-0.977** 
(0.293) 
-0.660** 
(0.162) 
-0.915** 
(0.254) 
Lagged Per Capita 
Income Growth 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
 
-0.034 
(0.040) 
-0.026 
(0.041) 
-0.058 
(0.045) 
Lagged Retail Wage 
Growth 
0.055* 
(0.031) 
 
0.091 
(0.057) 
0.065* 
(0.035) 
0.090 
(0.063) 
Lagged Travel Exp. 
Growth 
-0.163** 
(0.030) 
 
-0.157** 
(0.040) 
-0.166** 
(0.032) 
-0.157** 
(0.040) 
Lagged Unempl. 
Rate Growth 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
 
0.043** 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
Lagged Tax Rate 
Growth 
0.002 
(0.005) 
 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Lagged 
Construction Wage 
Growth 
0.004 
(0.012) 
 
0.054** 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.066** 
(0.022) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.26 0.19 0.17 0.17 
Observations 1,556 1,369 3,220 2,041 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering based on market. (*) 
represents statistically significant at ten percent level.  (**) represents statistically significant at five percent level. 
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TABLE 5 
Dependent Variable: Percent Idle Capacity 
 
Market County County-Sector City City-Sector 
 
Independent Variables 
    
Share of Market Capacity 
 
0.115** 
(0.027) 
 
0.177** 
(0.035) 
 
0.106** 
(0.022) 
 
0.157** 
(0.030) 
 
Opening of Incumbent Property 
 
0.43 
(1.16) 
-0.23 
(0.92) 
1.13 
(1.40) 
 
0.85 
(1.26) 
Opening of New Entrant Property  1.13* 
(0.59) 
 
4.42** 
(0.87) 
 
1.48** 
(0.63) 
 
4.94** 
(0.96) 
 
Market-Year Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Brand Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 
 
0.39 0.56 0.49 0.64 
Observations 14,884 5,493 15,361 5,858 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering around taxpayer identification.  
(*) represents statistically significant at ten percent level.  (**) represents statistically significant at five percent 
level. 
Independent properties are dropped when market is defined by county-sector or by city-sector. See footnote 16. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Room Changes as a Percent of Total Number of Rooms 
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